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Abstract
Background: Countries face conflicting incentives to report infectious disease outbreaks. Reports of outbreaks can prompt
other countries to impose trade and travel restrictions, which has the potential to discourage reporting. However, reports
can also bring medical assistance to contain the outbreak, including access to vaccines.
Methods: We compiled data on reports of meningococcal meningitis to the World Health Organization (WHO) from 54
African countries between 1966 and 2002, a period is marked by two events: first, a large outbreak reported from many
countries in 1987 associated with the Hajj that resulted in more stringent requirements for meningitis vaccination among
pilgrims; and second, another large outbreak in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1996 that led to a new international mechanism to
supply vaccines to countries reporting a meningitis outbreak. We used fixed-effects regression modeling to statistically
estimate the effect of external forcing events on the number of countries reporting cases of meningitis to WHO.
Findings: We find that the Hajj vaccination requirements started in 1988 were associated with reduced reporting, especially
among countries with relatively fewer cases reported between 1966 and 1979. After the vaccine provision mechanism was
in place in 1996, reporting among countries that had previously not reported meningitis outbreaks increased.
Interpretation: These results indicate that countries may respond to changing incentives to report outbreaks when they can
do so. In the long term, these incentives are likely to be more important than surveillance assistance in prompt reporting of
outbreaks.
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Introduction
Although international health regulations require countries to
report infectious disease outbreaks, [1] countries face disincentives
to do so, including reduced trade and tourism. [2] Donor
assistance for surveillance cannot overcome these disincentives,
but policies aimed at containing outbreaks, such as providing
subsidized vaccines to countries that report outbreaks, could
incentivize surveillance and reporting. [2] Here we look at
reporting of bacterial meningitis and find evidence that incentives
do matter.
Bacterial meningitis caused by Neisseria meningitides is the leading
cause of meningitis worldwide and a significant global health
challenge, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Meningococcal
meningitis epidemics in sub-Saharan Africa recur every 5–12
years and cause about 3,000–10,000 deaths each year. [3] At least
32 meningitis outbreaks were reported globally between 1971 and
2000, including a 1987 outbreak during the Hajj, the annual
Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, and a
1996 outbreak in Sub-Saharan Africa. [3–6]
In response to the 1987 outbreak, Saudi Arabia mandated
compulsory bivalent A and C vaccines for all pilgrims,
implemented annual vaccination campaigns for all local popula-
tions in high-risk areas, and provided oral ciprofloxacin to
travelers from the meningitis belt in sub-Saharan Africa in order
to lower carriage rates. Despite the vaccination requirements,
many pilgrims gained entry without being vaccinated and
moreover, these requirements were not strictly enforced. [7,8] At
$55 in 1987, the bivalent meningococcal vaccine was too
expensive for many travelers from endemic countries. In fact,
small outbreaks of meningococcal disease due to N. meningitidis
serogroup A were reported from Mecca and Jeddah in 1988 and
1992. [7,9] Saudi authorities reportedly focused on travelers from
countries with endemic meningococcal disease,7 and countries
sending pilgrims to the Hajj may have been reluctant to report
outbreaks lest their citizens be targeted.
In response to the 1996 outbreak, the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) formed the International Coordinating Group
(ICG) on Vaccine Provision for Epidemic Meningitis Control to
provide subsidized meningococcal vaccines to countries showing
that the number of cases per week in affected districts crossed the
epidemic threshold. Because vaccine provision is contingent on
reporting, countries have an incentive to report promptly. ICG has
accelerated improvements in the surveillance system in African
countries, which now have incentives to report cases. [10] To date,
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close to 30 million doses of meningococcal vaccine have been
channeled through ICG.
Similar efforts to coordinate the stockpiling and distribution of
yellow fever vaccine for Latin America and Africa through the
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation have had a
beneficial effect on yellow fever reporting. Similarly, the availabil-
ity a rinderpest vaccine resulted in improved surveillance and
reporting of cases. [11] Countries may explicitly demand access to
vaccines as a condition of reporting and sharing biological
samples, as was the case with H5N1 samples in Indonesia in
2008. [12]
In this paper, we empirically estimated the effect of the 1988
Hajj vaccination requirement and the ICG vaccine provision on
the likelihood that countries would report an outbreak, which we
define as reporting a positive number of meningitis cases.
Reporting of measles cases was used as a control for time-variant
changes in outbreak reporting incentives. We tested two hypoth-
eses. The first is that the Hajj vaccination requirements would
depress reporting. The second hypothesis is that the introduction
of ICG-supplied vaccines would improve meningitis reporting in
countries.
Materials and Methods
We obtained data on the number of meningitis cases reported
by 54 African countries during 1966–2002 and measles cases
reported by these same countries during 1980–2002. [13] (A list of
these countries is provided in Table S1.) Data on population size
and religion were obtained from CIA Fact book. [14] The number
of countries reporting is defined as the number reporting a positive
number of cases. Data on number of countries reporting and cases
reported were categorized into three periods: period one (1980–
1987, i.e., before the Saudi vaccination requirements), period two
(1989–1995, i.e., from the Saudi vaccination requirement to the
ICG vaccination program), and period three (1997–2002, i.e., with
the start of the ICG vaccination program).
We drop transition years between policy regimes in our
statistical analyses because policy regimes start midyear. The Hajj
vaccination requirement started some time in 1988, so we drop
that year. Although the ICG mechanism was formally announced
in 1997, the mechanism was actually begun in 1996 (personal
communication with David Heymann, former Executive Director
of the Communicable Disease Cluster at WHO, March 12, 2011).
Therefore, we drop 1996 as well. Finally, the ICG had its final
meeting in 2003, when it was replaced with a different vaccination
distribution mechanism. Therefore, we drop 2003 from the
analysis.
To test our two hypotheses, that the Saudi requirements
reduced reporting in period two and that the ICG program
increased reporting in period three, we construct a measure of the
trend in disease reporting. First, we created a binary variable that
indicates whether a country reported a positive number of
meningitis cases in a given year. We first-differenced this variable
to measure the change in reporting over time for a country. The
mean of this first difference in any given year measures the year-to-
year change in the fraction of African countries reporting
meningitis outbreaks that year. We constructed a similar variable
for measles reporting. We intend to employ trends in reporting of
measles to serve as a control for unobservable influence on health
and reporting by countries.
The primary test of our two hypotheses is presented in Figure 1.
The dashed line in Panel A plots the number of countries that
report a positive number of meningitis cases during 1980–2002.
The range of data is restricted to focus on dates that the data on
meningitis cases, the data on measles cases, and the policy
treatment periods overlap. The solid line in the panel reports the
total number of meningitis cases reported each year. Vertical
dotted lines indicate the start of the Hajj vaccination requirement
(1988) and the start of the ICG subsidized vaccine program (1996).
The number of countries that reported outbreaks peaks in 1987
and then falls dramatically after 1988. The decline ends in 1995
and continues to spike upwards after 1996, when the ICG
program counteracted the disincentive imposed by the Hajj
vaccination requirement. In contrast, the number of countries
reporting a positive number of measles cases is roughly the same
before the Hajj vaccination requirement as after it (Panel B).
Moreover, this number appears to have slightly decreased for a
few years after the ICG program began in 1996.
To determine whether the trends reported in Figure 1 were
statistically significant, we conducted a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to
determine whether the distribution of changes in year-to-year
reporting status of countries differs across the three periods. For
meningitis reporting, we find that reporting changes during the
Hajj requirement are lower than those in the pre-Hajj requirement
period (p = 0?09), though insignificant, and trends during the ICG
program are significantly higher than in prior periods (p = 0?04
versus pre-Hajj, p,0?01 versus Hajj). By contrast, reporting trends
for measles are highly insignificantly different across the three
policy periods.
To control for underlying country-level reporting, we estimated
a linear regression on country-level data on meningitis reporting
during 1980–2002. The dependent variable is the change in the
year-to-year reporting status of countries in a given year.
Independent variables include indicators for the Hajj vaccination
requirement period (1989–1995) and ICG program period (1997–
2002) to capture the influence of these policies on reporting, and
country fixed effects to capture invariant, country-level unobserv-
able variables. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level to
allow correlation between idiosyncratic differences in country
reporting over time. We ran five versions of this regression. In
specification (1), we examined only meningitis reporting. In
specification (2), we examined only measles reporting. In
specification (3), we examined both meningitis and measles
reporting. To separate the influence of policy treatments on each
disease, however, we included interactions between the policy
variables and the type of disease being reported. Specification (4)
examines meningitis reporting but limits the sample to Muslim
countries. Specification (5) also examines meningitis reporting but
limits the sample to non-Muslim countries.
Results
Regression results are presented in Table 1. Before the Hajj
vaccination requirement, there was a slight negative trend in
meningitis reporting. Relative to this baseline trend, meningitis
reporting fell after the Hajj vaccination requirement. According to
specification (1), each year an additional 5.0% (p= 0?02) of
countries stopped reporting a positive number of meningitis cases.
After the ICG program, however, reporting began trending
upwards, with 6.2% (p= 0?02) more countries reporting each year.
According to specification (2), reporting of measles outbreaks does
not show similar, statistically significant trend breaks under the
Hajj requirement or the ICB program. Specification (3) uses the
measles reporting trends as a control for meningitis reporting
trends. The comparison mitigates the decline in meningitis
reporting relative to baseline under the Hajj requirement and
amplifies the increase in reporting under the ICG program. The
change in trends under the ICG regime, however, remain
Incentives for Reporting Disease Outbreaks
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statistically significant. (We also performed the analysis using
cholera instead of measles as a control. Those results, presented in
Figure S1 and Table S2, are similar.) Comparing specification (4)
to specification (5) shows that the estimated effect of the Hajj
vaccination requirement is larger in Muslim than in non-Muslim
countries, as expected.
Although the Hajj vaccination requirement reduced the
probability that countries report a positive number of meningitis
cases (see Figure 1, Panel A), it was not associated with a
statistically significant reduction in the total number of meningitis
cases reported. A possible explanation is that the Hajj requirement
only reduced reporting among countries that previously had small
Figure 1. Meningitis and measles reporting by 54 countries in Africa, 1980–2002.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090290.g001
Table 1. Regression analysis of reporting trends, 1980–2002.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Meningitis Measles
Meningitis relative to
measles Meningitis: Muslim countries
Meningitis: non-Muslim
countries
Baseline 20.001 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.018
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.024)
Hajj policy 20.050*** 20.016 20.034* 20.054*** 20.024
(0.017) (0.013) (0.021) (0.017) (0.059)
ICG 0.062*** 20.004 0.066*** 0.053*** 0.135***
(0.018) (0.010) (0.020) (0.019) (0.050)
Obs. 1,080 1,080 2,160 960 120
Note. Observations are at the country x disease x year level. The data span 1980–2002 but exclude 1988 and 1996, transition years between policy regimes. Dependent
variable is the change in an indicator for whether a country reported a disease; so the dependent variable takes values -1, 0, or 1. Specification (1) includes data on
meningitis reporting only. Specification (2) includes data on measles reporting only. Specification (3) includes data on both types of reporting. Specifications (1), (2), (4),
and (5) include policy period indicators and country fixed effects. Specification (3) includes period indicators, those indicators interacted with a meningitis disease
indicator, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are reported below coefficients. ***/**/* indicate p,0N01/0N05/0N1. Specification (4) includes only data for countries
with Muslim (.1%) populations. Specification (5) includes only data on non-Muslim countries.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090290.t001
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outbreaks – outbreaks with few reported cases. After the Hajj
requirement, these countries could more credibly report no
outbreak than a country that previously had large outbreaks. If
countries with previously large outbreaks stopped reporting any
outbreaks, the Saudi government would be unlikely to believe
these countries truly had no outbreak.
To test this explanation, we sorted countries into whether they
were part of the so-called ‘‘meningitis belt’’, 21 countries that are
historically prone to meningitis outbreaks. According to Table 2,
countries in the meningitis belt had four-and-a-half times as many
cases, on average, during 1966–1979 as countries outside the belt.
Countries inside the meningitis belt were nearly 20% more likely
to report an outbreak (a positive number of cases) than those
outside the belt. Countries outside the belt had smaller popula-
tions. The percentages of their populations that were Muslim were
not appreciably lower than countries inside the belt.
Figure 2 (Panel A) plots the number of countries inside and
outside the meningitis belt that report a meningitis outbreak
during 1980–2002. Vertical dotted lines again indicate the start of
the Hajj vaccination requirement and the announcement of the
ICG vaccine program. The number of countries outside the belt
that reported outbreaks fell dramatically after 1988. The drop in
reporting for countries inside the belt—countries that could not
credibly hide an epidemic given their history of outbreaks—was
much lower. There was a sharp spike in reporting rates outside the
Table 2. Summary statistics, by whether countries are in meningitis belt.
In menin-gitis belt Population (2008, mil.)
Muslim population (2008,
percent of total population)
Percent of countries reporting
any cases (1966–79)
Reported cases per
country (1966–79, thous.)
No 12.21 44.08 64.94 0.3
(17.58) (40.44) (30.66) (0.50)
Yes 26.68 48.57 82.31 1.37
(34.11) (31.02) (21.24) (1.88)
All African 17.84 46.18 71.69 0.72
countries (26.15) (36.22) (28.57) (1.33)
Note: Observations are at the country-year level. Means shown. Standard deviations in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090290.t002
Figure 2. Meningitis reporting in African countries during 1980–2002, by whether countries are in meningitis belt or not.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090290.g002
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belt after 1996, when the ICG program counteracted the
disincentive imposed by the Hajj vaccination requirement.
Aggregate, annual statistics on the fraction of countries that
report a meningitis outbreak ignore a great deal of the dynamics of
such outbreaks. For example, outbreaks are seasonal, they may last
multiple years, they are affected by climate, and they depend on
the local impact of reactive vaccinations. Our annual and country-
level data abstract from these important considerations. Because
our analysis employs country fixed effects and interprets treatment
effects at the annual and national level, many of these
considerations are orthogonal to our treatment variables. As a
result, they do not bias our estimates of the impact of the Hajj
vaccination requirement and the ICG on outbreak reporting. To
test whether multi-year outbreaks might affect the analysis, we
replicated the regression analysis using two-year differences
instead of one-year differences. Our results, presented in Table
S3, were not substantively affected.
Nevertheless, it is helpful to look at reported outbreaks in a few
specific countries inside and outside the belt to see how their
reporting responded to changes in reporting incentives. Figure 3
plots the number of cases reported by four randomly selected
countries, two inside the meningitis belt (Cote d’Ivoire and
Democratic Republic of Congo) and two outside the meningitis
belt (Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea). As expected, far more cases
are reported inside the belt countries than outside the belt
countries. Although there is a great deal of annual variability from
year to year, both sets show a drop in reporting of cases during the
Hajj vaccination requirement period and three of the four show an
increase in reporting during the ICG program period.
Although our hypotheses concern the probability of reporting
an outbreak conditional on an outbreak, our empirical analysis
focuses simply on the unconditional probability of reporting a
positive number of cases. The unconditional probability of a
report is the conditional probability times the probability of an
outbreak. If the Hajj vaccination requirement or the ICG program
directly affected the unconditional probability of an outbreak and
the sign of this effect were similar to the effect on the conditional
probability of reporting, our results might incorrectly validate our
hypotheses. However, it is unlikely the trends in reporting depicted
in Figure 1 are the result of the policy regimes requirements
having actually altered vaccination practices and thus the number
of meningitis outbreaks.
First, if the Hajj vaccination requirement induced greater
vaccination, even countries that historically reported the largest
number of cases should have experienced a reduction in the
probability of reporting outbreaks. To check if this was the case,
we sorted countries into terciles based on the average number of
meningitis cases reported from 1966 to 1979. There are 18
countries per tercile. Figure 2 (Panel B) plots the number of
countries in each tercile that report a meningitis outbreak during
1980–2002. The number of countries in the bottom two terciles
that reported outbreaks fell dramatically after 1988. The drop in
reporting among top tercile countries was much lower. Therefore,
it is unlikely the Hajj vaccination requirement reduced the actual
number of outbreaks and likely that our measure of unconditional
probability of reporting tracks the conditional probability of
reporting during the requirement period.
Figure 3. Meningitis reporting in four randomly selected countries, two inside and two outside the meningitis belt.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090290.g003
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Second, if vaccination policies had an effect on the actual
number of outbreaks rather than merely on reporting, the ICG
program should have led to a reduction in reported outbreaks. Yet
Figure 1 and the regression analysis in Table 1 suggest that the
ICG program increased the number of reported outbreaks.
Therefore, our finding, if anything, understates the extent to
which the ICG program increased the conditional probability of
reporting.
It should be noted that the establishment of the ICG mechanism
was also the occasion for the WHO to develop a standardized
methodology of reporting meningitis. This methodology signifi-
cantly improved reporting, especially in the meningitis belt. This
procedural effect is distinct from the effect of a reward in the form
of vaccine access. However, the procedural effect of ICG is
unlikely to explain all of the change in reporting during period
three. Procedural improvements were expected to have larger
effects in meningitis belt countries, yet Figure 2 (Panel A) shows a
larger effect in non-belt countries (and in bottom tercile countries).
Moreover, procedural improvements should have greater impact
on the number of cases reported rather than whether a country
reports. Our findings demonstrate a bump in the latter.
Finally, although our results support our hypothesis that the
Hajj vaccination requirement and the ICG program affected the
incentives to report meningitis outbreaks, i.e., a positive number of
meningitis cases, we caution that observational studies of this
nature cannot prove causality and are subject to unobserved
confounding variables that may not be adequately accounted for
by our control variables.
Discussion
Incentives for surveillance and reporting are fundamental for
prompt reporting of outbreaks to curtail potential global pandem-
ics. For instance, modeling studies have suggested that an
emerging pandemic of avian influenza could be contained if cases
suggesting human-to-human transmission are reported within
three weeks of the index case. [15,16] Surveillance and reporting
decisions, as well as the initiation of early rapid containment, are
the responsibilities of national governments. Although efforts to
build a global early warning system have focused on technical
assistance for improved detection in countries where disease
outbreaks are likely, modern surveillance systems do nothing to
improve countries’ incentives for reporting.2 A country with few
incentives to report will not effectively implement surveillance.
Moreover, outbreak reporting involves more than sharing data on
epidemiological burden—it also involves sharing of biological
data.
Here we show that incentives, rather than just financial
assistance to build surveillance networks, could alter reporting
decisions, especially when the burden of disease is low. The ability
to contain outbreaks is also important; countries are unlikely to
look for outbreaks that they can do little to contain, especially
under threat of sanctions. In our study, policies that changed the
benefits of reporting had little effect on reporting by countries with
a large burden of meningococcal meningitis, but significantly
altered reporting by countries with fewer cases.
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